A few days ago, we learnt of the heinous killing of Mohammad Akhlaq - a 58-year old blacksmith in Dadri who allegedly slaughtered a cow. A mob of people deemed it appropriate to lynch Mr. Mohammad Akhlaq to death. This incident has seen a polarization of people - those whose collective conscience has been shocked by an event so unimaginably dastardly, and those in power who have conspicuously maintained silence over it, and whose silence is arguably a condonation of the incident.
Personally, the incident and its aftermath have made me quite sad about the state of affairs in the country. It's times like these when you stop to wonder whether the Constitution of India - the real sacred text of the nation - is as meaningless as the cold-blooded murder of an innocent person for what he may or may not have eaten for dinner.
It also made me wonder about what the Constitution of India and other laws say about cow slaughter, albeit having been reduced to nothing in these circumstances.
Part IV of the Constitution of India contains Directive Principles of State Policy, which are long-term socio-economic goals that the State must endeavour to give effect through its laws.
Article 48 of the Constitution of India provides for the following Directive Principle of State Policy:
"48. Organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry.—The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle."
If one were to examine the genesis of the present-day Article 48, one would find that some members of the Constituent Assembly originally lobbied for it to be part of the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution. Ultimately, the topic was moved to the domain of Directive Principles of State Policy, on the realization that the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution apply to humans, and not animals. The issue was, therefore, considered to be of national and Constitutional importance, and it was there to stay, albeit in Part IV and not Part III of the Constitution.
The prevention of cow slaughter has been given an obvious economic hue in the Constitution, with the modernization of agriculture and prohibition of cow slaughter being extolled in (what seems like) the same breath. But what really stands out in the text of the Debates is that there is really a very blurry line between the economic and religious justification for prohibiting cow slaughter.
On the one hand, those lobbying for such a prohibition speak of an urgent need to help an agrarian economy (oxen being the solution to that problem) and to improve the nourishment and well-being of the nation's people (on the basis that the protection and preservation of cows = more milk for human beings to drink). On the other hand though, it is difficult to ignore that these economic arguments lapse, sooner or later, into a commentary on the sacred status of the cow in Indian (Hindu?) society. References to Lord Krishna flow easily, and justifications are even offered based on Prophet Mohammad never having consumed beef. I would go to the extent of saying that those advocating restrictions on the prohibition of cow slaughter fail to convince that such a provision in the Constitution was being included for purely economic reasons - or maybe there was no such intention.
Regardless of the multitude of facts and figures cited by this section of the Constituent Assembly, there can be scant doubt that a Hindu agenda was being pushed. A case in point is the somewhat feeble rationalization offered by Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena:
"Sir, there are two aspects to this question. One is the religious aspect and the other is the economic aspect. I shall first deal with the religious aspect. I am not one of those men who think that merely because a thing has a religious aspect, it should not be enacted as law. I personally feel that cow protection, if it has become a part of the religion of the Hindus, it is because of its economic and other aspects, I believe that the Hindu religion is based mostly on the principles which have been found useful to the people of this country in the course of centuries. Therefore, if thirty crores of our population feel that this thing should be incorporated in the laws of the country, I do not think that we as an Assembly representing 35 crores should leave it out merely because it has a religious aspect. I agree with Seth Govind Das that we should not think that because a thing has a religious significance, so it is bad. I say, religion itself sanctifies what is economically good."
In fact, some members of the Assembly went on to question the very economic justification that the Directive Principle was premised on. Mr. Z.H. Lari argued that the contents of the first part of the Article dealing with modern and scientific agriculture simply "do not fit in" with the subsequent text banning the slaughter of cattle.
Similarly, Mr. Syed Muhammad Saiadulla expressed his reservations that the economic justification was merely a "back-door entry" to "satisfy the ingrained Hindu feeling against slaughter". He pointed out the inconsistency between the introduction of scientific measures and the uneconomical retention of the sizeable cattle population that is past its prime, and useless from the perspective of agriculture.
There was criticism for the "back-door entry" of the prohibition of cow slaughter from more than one member of the Assembly. Mr. Z.H. Lari called upon the majority community to not tiptoe around the issue and address it in unambiguous terms:
"Mr. Vice-President, I appreciate the sentiments of those who want protection of the cow - may be on religious grounds or maybe in the interests of agriculture in this country. I have come here not to oppose or support any of the amendments but to request the House to make the position quite clear and not to leave the matter in any ambiguity or doubt. The House, at the same time, must appreciate that Mussalmans of India have been, and are, under the impression that they can, without violence to the principles which govern the State, sacrifice cows and other animals on the occasion of Bakrid. It is for the majority to decide one way or the other. We are not here to obstruct the attitude that the majority community is going to adopt. But let there not linger an idea in the mind of the Muslim public that they can do one thing, though in fact they are not expected to do that...My own submission to this House is that it is better to come forward and incorporate a clause in Fundamental Rights that cow slaughter is henceforth prohibited, rather than it being left vague in the Directive Principles, leaving it open to Provincial Governments to adopt it one way or the other, and even without adopting definite legislation to resort to emergency powers under the Criminal Procedure. In the interests of good-will in the country and of cordial relations between the different communities I submit that this is the proper occasion when the majority should express itself clearly and definitely."
Mr. Frank Anthony echoed this sentiment somewhat:
"I would have sponsored a provision that a ban on cow-slaughter should have been introduced in the Fundamental Rights and that cow-slaughter should be made a cognisable offence. But, there were not people who were prepared to do that. Why bring in this provision in an indirect way? If it offends your religious susceptibilities, just as much as I expect you to respect my religious susceptibilities. I am prepared to respect yours. As I said, why bring it in, in this indirect way, as an afterthought into the Directive Principles?"
After some deliberation on whose domain the implementation of this goal must fall within, the framers of our Constitution left this issue to each State to handle in the manner considered fit by it. As a result, List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution, which deals with subjects that the States (as opposed to the Centre) can legislate on includes at Entry number 15: "Preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases; veterinary training and practice."
So in the present day India, it is up to each State to decide whether and how they want to satisfy the requirements of Article 48 and Entry 15 of the State List. Most States have enacted laws to ban the slaughter of cows, though the specific provisions and penal consequences in these legislations vary. Notable exceptions are Kerala and States in the North East, where beef is legally consumed, and widely so.
Let us now examine the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, which applies to Dadri, where Akhlaq was lynched to death.
Section 3 prohibits the slaughter of a cow, bull or oxen, "anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any usage or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." Section 5 of the Act prohibits the sale and transport of beef with this exception - "[a] person may sell and serve or cause to be sold and severed beef or beef or beef-products for consumption by a bona fide passenger in an aircraft or railway train." Somehow, these "bona fide passengers" were deemed worthy of committing an act that would have serious penal consequences for non-passengers.
But this doesn't even begin to describe the arbitrary nature of this enactment.
We now look at the penalty for contravening Sections 3 and 5, which can be found at Section 8(1) of the Act: "Whoever contravenes or abets the contravention of the provisions of Section 3, Section 5 or Section 5-A shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees." Section 9 goes on to add that the offences punishable under Section 8(1) shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
Let us take a moment here and examine the absurdity of this provision. For comparison, we can turn to Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which makes punishable the causing of "the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide" with upto two years' imprisonment or fine or both. Just to put things into perspective here, Messers Sushil and Gopal Ansal, responsible for the fire in Uphaar Cinema in Delhi which killed 59 people, were charged under this provision (although it is debatable whether this was appropriate), and got off with even less than two years' imprisonment. In contrast, the killing of a cow may have made them liable for seven years' imprisonment.
Of course, this discussion is purely academic. Because Mr. Akhlaq never even got the chance to defend himself under this Act. A mob of men decided that they were more than sufficient to perform the roles of prosecution, judge and jury, pronouncing Mr. Akhlaq guilty in their own heinous way. And to think Akhlaq could have defended himself even under this arbitrary law, had he been alive today. Now the discourse is different - it isn't about whether Mr. Akhlaq was guilty under a legislation that probably shouldn't even exist in the first place, but about whether his death was murder at the hands of a merciless majority. There are people in this country who are justifying it on different grounds, including it being "an accident".
As is evident from a perusal of the Constituent Assembly Debates, a religious majority bulldozed its way through at least one provision of what would eventually form the foundational document of a nascent nation - to incorporate a prohibition on cow slaughter, ostensibly on economic grounds. Over sixty years later, a mob comprising the same religious majority thought it fit to kill for the same ideal. The Constituent Assembly deliberated over almost a century had passed since a widespread revolt had sparked off upon Hindu and Muslim sepoys being allegedly forced to bite cartridges laced with cow fat and pork fat, respectively. Apparently, this was not a large significant passage of time to learn to respect the sentiments of a religious community other than your own.
The Constituent Assembly painstakingly evolved what they thought was the best possible embodiment of the freedoms and responsibilities of a young nation. I wonder what it would have made of the the citizens of this very nation purportedly killing in the name of an idea that was deemed to be a Directive Principle of State Policy, while at the same time trampling underfoot the carefully crafted Fundamental Rights.
Personally, the incident and its aftermath have made me quite sad about the state of affairs in the country. It's times like these when you stop to wonder whether the Constitution of India - the real sacred text of the nation - is as meaningless as the cold-blooded murder of an innocent person for what he may or may not have eaten for dinner.
It also made me wonder about what the Constitution of India and other laws say about cow slaughter, albeit having been reduced to nothing in these circumstances.
Part IV of the Constitution of India contains Directive Principles of State Policy, which are long-term socio-economic goals that the State must endeavour to give effect through its laws.
Article 48 of the Constitution of India provides for the following Directive Principle of State Policy:
"48. Organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry.—The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle."
If one were to examine the genesis of the present-day Article 48, one would find that some members of the Constituent Assembly originally lobbied for it to be part of the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution. Ultimately, the topic was moved to the domain of Directive Principles of State Policy, on the realization that the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution apply to humans, and not animals. The issue was, therefore, considered to be of national and Constitutional importance, and it was there to stay, albeit in Part IV and not Part III of the Constitution.
The prevention of cow slaughter has been given an obvious economic hue in the Constitution, with the modernization of agriculture and prohibition of cow slaughter being extolled in (what seems like) the same breath. But what really stands out in the text of the Debates is that there is really a very blurry line between the economic and religious justification for prohibiting cow slaughter.
On the one hand, those lobbying for such a prohibition speak of an urgent need to help an agrarian economy (oxen being the solution to that problem) and to improve the nourishment and well-being of the nation's people (on the basis that the protection and preservation of cows = more milk for human beings to drink). On the other hand though, it is difficult to ignore that these economic arguments lapse, sooner or later, into a commentary on the sacred status of the cow in Indian (Hindu?) society. References to Lord Krishna flow easily, and justifications are even offered based on Prophet Mohammad never having consumed beef. I would go to the extent of saying that those advocating restrictions on the prohibition of cow slaughter fail to convince that such a provision in the Constitution was being included for purely economic reasons - or maybe there was no such intention.
Regardless of the multitude of facts and figures cited by this section of the Constituent Assembly, there can be scant doubt that a Hindu agenda was being pushed. A case in point is the somewhat feeble rationalization offered by Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena:
"Sir, there are two aspects to this question. One is the religious aspect and the other is the economic aspect. I shall first deal with the religious aspect. I am not one of those men who think that merely because a thing has a religious aspect, it should not be enacted as law. I personally feel that cow protection, if it has become a part of the religion of the Hindus, it is because of its economic and other aspects, I believe that the Hindu religion is based mostly on the principles which have been found useful to the people of this country in the course of centuries. Therefore, if thirty crores of our population feel that this thing should be incorporated in the laws of the country, I do not think that we as an Assembly representing 35 crores should leave it out merely because it has a religious aspect. I agree with Seth Govind Das that we should not think that because a thing has a religious significance, so it is bad. I say, religion itself sanctifies what is economically good."
In fact, some members of the Assembly went on to question the very economic justification that the Directive Principle was premised on. Mr. Z.H. Lari argued that the contents of the first part of the Article dealing with modern and scientific agriculture simply "do not fit in" with the subsequent text banning the slaughter of cattle.
Similarly, Mr. Syed Muhammad Saiadulla expressed his reservations that the economic justification was merely a "back-door entry" to "satisfy the ingrained Hindu feeling against slaughter". He pointed out the inconsistency between the introduction of scientific measures and the uneconomical retention of the sizeable cattle population that is past its prime, and useless from the perspective of agriculture.
There was criticism for the "back-door entry" of the prohibition of cow slaughter from more than one member of the Assembly. Mr. Z.H. Lari called upon the majority community to not tiptoe around the issue and address it in unambiguous terms:
"Mr. Vice-President, I appreciate the sentiments of those who want protection of the cow - may be on religious grounds or maybe in the interests of agriculture in this country. I have come here not to oppose or support any of the amendments but to request the House to make the position quite clear and not to leave the matter in any ambiguity or doubt. The House, at the same time, must appreciate that Mussalmans of India have been, and are, under the impression that they can, without violence to the principles which govern the State, sacrifice cows and other animals on the occasion of Bakrid. It is for the majority to decide one way or the other. We are not here to obstruct the attitude that the majority community is going to adopt. But let there not linger an idea in the mind of the Muslim public that they can do one thing, though in fact they are not expected to do that...My own submission to this House is that it is better to come forward and incorporate a clause in Fundamental Rights that cow slaughter is henceforth prohibited, rather than it being left vague in the Directive Principles, leaving it open to Provincial Governments to adopt it one way or the other, and even without adopting definite legislation to resort to emergency powers under the Criminal Procedure. In the interests of good-will in the country and of cordial relations between the different communities I submit that this is the proper occasion when the majority should express itself clearly and definitely."
Mr. Frank Anthony echoed this sentiment somewhat:
"I would have sponsored a provision that a ban on cow-slaughter should have been introduced in the Fundamental Rights and that cow-slaughter should be made a cognisable offence. But, there were not people who were prepared to do that. Why bring in this provision in an indirect way? If it offends your religious susceptibilities, just as much as I expect you to respect my religious susceptibilities. I am prepared to respect yours. As I said, why bring it in, in this indirect way, as an afterthought into the Directive Principles?"
After some deliberation on whose domain the implementation of this goal must fall within, the framers of our Constitution left this issue to each State to handle in the manner considered fit by it. As a result, List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution, which deals with subjects that the States (as opposed to the Centre) can legislate on includes at Entry number 15: "Preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases; veterinary training and practice."
So in the present day India, it is up to each State to decide whether and how they want to satisfy the requirements of Article 48 and Entry 15 of the State List. Most States have enacted laws to ban the slaughter of cows, though the specific provisions and penal consequences in these legislations vary. Notable exceptions are Kerala and States in the North East, where beef is legally consumed, and widely so.
Let us now examine the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, which applies to Dadri, where Akhlaq was lynched to death.
Section 3 prohibits the slaughter of a cow, bull or oxen, "anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any usage or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." Section 5 of the Act prohibits the sale and transport of beef with this exception - "[a] person may sell and serve or cause to be sold and severed beef or beef or beef-products for consumption by a bona fide passenger in an aircraft or railway train." Somehow, these "bona fide passengers" were deemed worthy of committing an act that would have serious penal consequences for non-passengers.
But this doesn't even begin to describe the arbitrary nature of this enactment.
We now look at the penalty for contravening Sections 3 and 5, which can be found at Section 8(1) of the Act: "Whoever contravenes or abets the contravention of the provisions of Section 3, Section 5 or Section 5-A shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees." Section 9 goes on to add that the offences punishable under Section 8(1) shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
Let us take a moment here and examine the absurdity of this provision. For comparison, we can turn to Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which makes punishable the causing of "the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide" with upto two years' imprisonment or fine or both. Just to put things into perspective here, Messers Sushil and Gopal Ansal, responsible for the fire in Uphaar Cinema in Delhi which killed 59 people, were charged under this provision (although it is debatable whether this was appropriate), and got off with even less than two years' imprisonment. In contrast, the killing of a cow may have made them liable for seven years' imprisonment.
Of course, this discussion is purely academic. Because Mr. Akhlaq never even got the chance to defend himself under this Act. A mob of men decided that they were more than sufficient to perform the roles of prosecution, judge and jury, pronouncing Mr. Akhlaq guilty in their own heinous way. And to think Akhlaq could have defended himself even under this arbitrary law, had he been alive today. Now the discourse is different - it isn't about whether Mr. Akhlaq was guilty under a legislation that probably shouldn't even exist in the first place, but about whether his death was murder at the hands of a merciless majority. There are people in this country who are justifying it on different grounds, including it being "an accident".
As is evident from a perusal of the Constituent Assembly Debates, a religious majority bulldozed its way through at least one provision of what would eventually form the foundational document of a nascent nation - to incorporate a prohibition on cow slaughter, ostensibly on economic grounds. Over sixty years later, a mob comprising the same religious majority thought it fit to kill for the same ideal. The Constituent Assembly deliberated over almost a century had passed since a widespread revolt had sparked off upon Hindu and Muslim sepoys being allegedly forced to bite cartridges laced with cow fat and pork fat, respectively. Apparently, this was not a large significant passage of time to learn to respect the sentiments of a religious community other than your own.
The Constituent Assembly painstakingly evolved what they thought was the best possible embodiment of the freedoms and responsibilities of a young nation. I wonder what it would have made of the the citizens of this very nation purportedly killing in the name of an idea that was deemed to be a Directive Principle of State Policy, while at the same time trampling underfoot the carefully crafted Fundamental Rights.
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